Jump and free fall! Memory, attention, and decision-making processes in an extreme sport by Castellà, Judit et al.
Jump and free fall! Memory, attention, and decision-making processes in
an extreme sport
Judit Castellà , Jaume Boned, Jorge Luis Méndez-Ulrich and Antoni Sanz
Department of Basic, Developmental, and Educational Psychology, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Catalonia
ABSTRACT
In the present study, we explored the effects of high arousal on cognitive performance
when facing a situation of risk. We also investigated how these effects are moderated
by either positive or negative emotional states (valence). An ecological methodology
was employed, and a field study was carried out in a real-life situation with 39
volunteer participants performing a bungee jumping activity and a control group of
39 participants. Arousal and valence were assessed with the Self-Assessment
Manikin (SAM). Working memory capacity (reverse digit span), selective attention
(Go/No-Go task) and decision-making (Iowa Gambling Task) were assessed at 3 time
points: 30 min before the jump, immediately after the jump, and approximately
8 min after the onset of the previous phase. The results indicate that high arousal
accompanied by high positive valence scores after jumping either improved
performance or led to a lack of impairment in certain cognitive tasks. The
Processing-Efficiency and the Broaden-and-Build theories are put forward to explain
emotional moderation of cognitive performance in potentially life-threatening
situations.
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In laboratory settings, a large body of research has
demonstrated that cognitive processing is influenced
by affective state and it has been argued that high
arousal provokes deficits in attentional control,
which leads to impairments in performing tasks that
involve the central executive of working memory /
prefrontal cortex (Arnsten, 2009; Eysenck, Derakshan,
Santos, & Calvo, 2007). However, one obvious
problem that arises when testing these relationships
in the laboratory is that intense emotional responses
cannot be artificially induced for ethical and practical
reasons. In this regard, there is a lack of empirical
data that ascertains the mechanisms underpinning
emotion and cognition in real-life situations that
intrinsically elicit a high emotional response, and
thus there is a need to add ecological validity to cog-
nition studies (Brewer, 2000; Ruffman, 2011; Shadish,
Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
To our knowledge, only a few studies have
explored the impact of affective response on cognitive
abilities in real-life contexts. For instance, Idzikowski
and Baddeley (1987) tested parachutists on a range
of cognitive tasks prior to entering the aircraft. A
decline in almost all measures was found, which was
interpreted in terms of impairment in the functioning
of the central executive component of working
memory (Baddeley, 1986, 2007; Baddeley & Hitch,
1974). Leach and Griffith (2008) administered a task
that involved both storage and processing com-
ponents of working memory, to novice and expert
parachutists. However, unlike Idzikowski and Badde-
ley, participants were also tested immediately after
landing. Novice and experienced parachutists
showed a decrease in performance in both com-
ponents of the task prior to the jump, but in the
landing phase novice participants performed signifi-
cantly worse while experienced parachutists showed
full recovery of the storage component. These
results differ somewhat from those found by Robin-
son, Sünram-Lea, Leach, and Owen-Lynch (2008),
since participants undergoing an evacuation from a
submerged and inverted helicopter who were
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administered a similar task showed no impairment
prior to task exposure, but performance was signifi-
cantly reduced following stress exposure. In another
study (Robinson, Leach, Owen-Lynch, & Sünram-Lea,
2013), participants who underwent a fire-fighting
emergency simulation also reported impairments in
visual memory when tested immediately after the
exercise. Finally, British Royal Air Force aircrew
members participating in a military survival exercise
were given various attentional tasks and showed a sig-
nificant decrease in selective and sustained attention,
suggesting an impairment in the ability to hold active
memory representations in the presence of interfer-
ence (Leach & Ansell, 2008).
Taken together, the studies conducted in real-life
environments with powerful stressors seem to have
yielded mixed results. However, the vast majority
mainly report impairments before, and particularly
after, exposure to a highly arousing situation on a
range of cognitive tasks. A theory that can be put
forward to explain this decline is the Processing
Efficiency Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck &
Calvo, 1992). The theory aims to explain how anxiety
impacts performance and assumes that worry is acti-
vated under stressful situations, which causes interfer-
ence by consuming the limited resources of the
storage and processing components of working
memory, which in turn enhances the use of auxiliary
strategies to minimise the negative state of anxiety.
A recent reformulation (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011)
includes the ideas that (1) anxiety reduces the focus
of attention to threat-related stimuli, and (2) inhibition
and shifting functions of the central executive become
impaired. However, this theory would predict no
differences in performance after exposure to the stres-
sor because under stressful circumstances working
memory capacity is taken up with negative thoughts
related to the task at hand, which are supposed to
cease after exposure. Nevertheless, many of the
cited studies have reported a detrimental effect on
performance after experiencing a high arousal or
extreme situation (Leach & Ansell, 2008; Robinson
et al., 2008, 2013). One possible explanation is that
participants may have some residual anxiety and so
their resources for information processing have not
been restored to baseline levels immediately after
exposure, particularly if the arousing activity involves
an acute increase in activation or if the participants
are not experts and are therefore unable to rapidly
decrease their anxiety and the negative outcomes of
worry.
In our study, we wanted to explore these dynamics
in a situation that produces a peak in arousal, lasting
less than one minute in total, and, unlike previous
studies has the particularity of being a leisure activity.
Therefore, we recruited participants who voluntarily
took part in a bungee jumping session, which involves
jumping from a high bridge with a long elastic rope
tied to a full-body harness, so that the participant is
pulled back by the rope before hitting the ground.
Only novice jumpers were tested since previous
studies in jumpers such as parachutists have shown
that levels of expertise can markedly affect self-
reported arousal, physiological measures (Fenz &
Epstein, 1967) and the impact of these variables on
cognitive abilities (Idzikowski & Baddeley, 1987).
Hennig, Laschefski, and Opper (1994) conducted a
study on novice bungee jumpers and found higher
subjective ratings of anxiety before the jump, which
rapidly dropped thereafter, and higher levels of sali-
vary cortisol after the jump, which returned to base-
line within an hour. Interestingly, following the jump,
a 200% increase in β-endorphin was found, which cor-
related with euphoria ratings. They also found that
blood pressure and heart rate were markedly
affected by the stressful nature of the activity. Taken
together, these findings suggest that bungee
jumping could be an optimal setting for conducting
research on how emotion could affect cognitive pro-
cesses in a real-life environment.
Moreover, the characteristics of the activity allows
for exploring not only subjective arousal, but also
valence, which might be positive and could have the
potential to moderate the negative effects of anxiety
on cognition predicted by the processing efficiency
theory. Valence is another fundamental dimension of
affective states (Bradley & Lang, 1994; Russell, 1980)
and its interaction with arousal has proven to be key
in reported distortions in cognitive processes such as
size perception (Geuss, Stefanucci, de Benedictis-
Kessner, & Stevens, 2010), colour perception (Ziems
& Christman, 1998), temporal perception (Angrilli,
Cherubini, Pavese, & Manfredini, 1997; Castellà,
Cuello, & Sanz, 2017), or motor planning (Coombes,
Higgins, Gamble, Cauraugh, & Janelle, 2009). Regard-
ing the cognitive tasks used in the present study,
working memory was assessed due to its relevant
role in complex cognitive abilities (Baddeley, Gather-
cole, & Papagno, 1998; Jonides, 1995; Salthouse,
1992). Selective attention was also tested due to its
critical role in daily life performance and its relation-
ship with working memory processes (Awh, Vogel, &
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Oh, 2006; Engle, Kane, & Tuholski, 1999). In addition to
these two basic skills that play an important role in
normal cognitive functioning, we also assessed the
high-level process of decision-making, which is deter-
mined by emotion (Damasio, 1998). If these capacities
are distorted or interrupted under conditions of high
arousal, the individual’s ability to respond and react
might be compromised, leading to negative conse-
quences in situations where life is at risk. However,
the positive valence associated with the activity
might play a role that is worth exploring and rep-
resents a novel aspect of the present study. With this
purpose in mind, several cognitive tasks were adminis-
tered to a group of bungee jumpers before the jump,
immediately after the jump, and at a third time point
after the jump. On the basis of the processing
efficiency theory and previously reported findings,
we expected to find impaired cognitive performance
immediately after the jump in comparison with a
control group. However, valence might have the
potential to moderate the negative impact of high
arousal (Angrilli et al., 1997; Castellà et al., 2017).
Methods
Participants
The original sample consisted of 80 participants, 41 of
which were individuals attending a bungee jumping
session and that consented to voluntarily take part
in the study after being informed about the pro-
cedure. The control group consisted of a group of 39
participants with similar characteristics in terms of
age and gender. This group performed the tasks fol-
lowing the same procedure as the experimental
group, and were recruited and assessed in a similar
environment but without experiencing any arousing
activity between phases. Thus, the whole sample
was incidental and recruited in situ. Two participants
were excluded because they failed to complete the
questionnaires and/or correctly carry out the online
tasks. The final sample therefore consisted of 78 par-
ticipants, 39 males (50%) and 39 females (50%). In
the jump group 56% were male and 44% female,
ranging from 18 to 39 years old (M = 24.8, SD = 5.59),
and in the control group 56% were female and 44%
male, ranging from 18 to 33 years old (M = 22.3, SD
= 3.29). Of the jump group, 90.3% of the participants
had no prior experience of bungee jumping.
Additional mean comparison analyses revealed that
there were no significant differences in any of the
obtained measures as a function of gender. Moreover,
age did not significantly correlate with any of the vari-
ables. Therefore, these two socio-demographic vari-
ables were not subject to any further analysis as
independent variables.
Materials
The experimenters carried an identifier so that partici-
pants could recognise them as researchers from the
Autonomous University of Barcelona conducting a
psychological study on high-risk sports. A question-
naire designed in Google Forms and synchronised in
real time with a Google Spreadsheet was administered
using smartphones with a 5.8-inch screen in each of
the three phases. The questionnaire included the
Self-Assessment Manikin test (SAM; Bradley & Lang,
1994), which is a pictorial assessment instrument
that addresses the dimensional analysis of affective
states. The participants were presented with the two
sets of pictograms for each of the two affective dimen-
sions (arousal and valence), and were asked to assess
their current state on a Likert scale ranging from 1 to
9. The questionnaires also included a memory span
task, and socio-demographic variables (age, sex, and
previous experience in bungee jumping or a related
activity). Working memory was assessed by a reverse
digit span task that consists of encoding an increasing
series of digits (from 3 to 6 items) and retrieving them
verbally in the reverse order, thereby involving
storage and processing of verbal information. Two
measures were taken: span – defined as the
maximum list length that the participant could cor-
rectly recall in reverse order for at least 1 out of the
2 series of a given span – and a less strict measure,
that is, the total number of correct series recalled
without stopping the scoring when they failed to
recall the two series of a given span.
In addition to the questionnaire, the participants
performed 2 online experimental tasks on smart-
phones: A Go/No-Go task, to assess selective attention,
and the Iowa gambling task to assess decision-
making. The tasks were performed using Presen-
tation® (2018), more specifically, Psych Lab 101 soft-
ware, which is a platform developed by this
company and contains several cognitive psychology
experiments especially designed to be run on smart-
phones, adapted to touch responses, and available
for Android and IOS devices. In the Go/No-Go task par-
ticipants had to respond by touching the screen (Go)
every time a letter A, B, or C appeared, and withhold
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responses (No-Go) when an X was shown. There were
72 trials (48 Go and 24 No-Go, randomly presented),
and items were presented successively for 1000 ms
with an ISI of 700 ms. Reaction time (RT) and accuracy
were recorded. The Iowa Gambling Task used was
based on the original task designed by Bechara,
Damasio, Damasio, and Anderson (1994). This con-
sisted of 50 trials using four decks of cards. The partici-
pants had to choose from the decks with the objective
of winning as much as possible without being con-
sciously aware of the reward/penalty properties of
each deck. Two decks had small rewards and penal-
ties, but led to a net gain over time whilst the other
two decks carried large rewards and penalties but
led to a net loss over time. These specific tasks were
chosen for being paradigmatic in working memory,
attention, and decision making research, and
because they were sufficiently short to capture the
impact of emotional responses.
Design and procedure
The study was carried out following the ethical stan-
dards for human research of the Ethical Committee
of the Autonomous University of Barcelona. The pro-
cedure for the jump group consisted of three
phases, which took place at different times: Phase 1:
Approximately half an hour before jumping, Phase 2:
immediately after the jump, and Phase 3: approxi-
mately 8 min after the onset of the previous phase.
The procedure used for the control group was identi-
cal in terms of the timing of the phases and tasks, and
it was carried out in a very similar environment (out-
doors, with a certain degree of social interaction and
noise, at 3 different times), the difference being that
they did not engage in any arousing or emotional
activity between phases, and therefore no emotional
changes were expected to occur between these
phases. The resulting design was a 3 (phase as a
within-subjects factor) x 2 (group as a between-sub-
jects factor) quasi-experimental design.
Data was collected for the jump group at the bridge
(see Figure 1) where the bungee jumping activity
was scheduled (Castellbell i el Vilar, Catalonia; UTM
coordinates: N 41°37.39′ E 1°51.299′) in 3 different ses-
sions organised by La Sargantana, a local enterprise
that specialises in risky sports such as climbing, canyon-
ing, and bungee jumping, and which agreed to partici-
pate in this study. The enterprise is run by certified
mountain guides who are authorised by current legis-
lation and follow the standard security protocols. The
experimenters met the jumpers before starting the
activity, informed them about the research, and
asked for permission to voluntarily take part. After the
first questionnaire and tasks had been administered
(Phase 1, which lasted around 8 min), the participants
were identified with a code so that their anonymous
data could bematched with those collected in the sub-
sequent phases. They then proceeded to listen to the
team of guides who instructed them on how to jump
safely. Two experts monitored the jump, and the rope
was tied to a full-body harness. The height of the
bridge was 30 m and the total free fall was 15 m, fol-
lowed by a pendulum movement for approximately
25 s until touching the ground; thus the whole
episode lasted around half a minute. At approximately
30 min after the first phase, Phase 2 then took place
immediately after the jump. The experimenter
approached each participant at the jump reception
point as they were removing the harness and the ques-
tionnaire and tasks were administered again. Phase 2
was followed by Phase 3, which started approximately
8 min after the onset of Phase 2, and consisted of
repeating the whole procedure. Note that digits in
the reverse digit span task were different in each
phase but counterbalanced across participants. The
SAM test was always administered at the beginning
of each testing phase but the order of the 3 cognitive
tasks was counterbalanced to minimise learning and
order effects, so that in each experimental session, a
certain order was used following a Latin-square
design (Span-Go-Iowa, Go-Iowa-Span, Iowa-Span-Go).
Results
At first glance, the scores obtained in each phase for
the affective variables, i.e. the means for arousal and
valence, were higher in the jump group compared
with the control group in all of the phases. A one-
way ANOVA revealed that these differences were stat-
istically significant for both parameters in all the
phases, except for the arousal score in Phase 3, indicat-
ing that the task (jumping) was able to induce acute
changes in both variables, increasing valence, but par-
ticularly arousal. Table 1 summarises the mean scores
of arousal and valence in each group and the signifi-
cance of the comparison between groups.
The pattern of results obtained for both parameters
and the significant differences between phases in the
two groups are graphically represented in Figures 2
and 3. A significant interaction between phase
and group was found for arousal (F(2,148) = 33.31,
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p < .001, partial η2 = .31) and valence (F(2,138) = 10.01,
p < .001, partial η2 = .13). In the jump group, the con-
trasts (simple method) of the within-subjects linear
model showed that the changes in arousal were
statistically significant between Phase 1 and Phase 2
(F(1,39) = 87.07, p < .001, partial η2 = .69), and
between Phase 2 and Phase 3 (F(1,39) = 75.11,
p < .001, partial η2 = .66). No significant differences
Figure 1. Photographic images of the study settings. General view of the bridge, experimenters, and participants during a jump.
Figure 2. Mean (and standard error) arousal scores. *Difference is sig-
nificant at p < .05. **Difference is significant at p < .005.
Figure 3. Mean (and standard error) valence scores. **Difference is
significant at p < .005.
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were found between Phase 1 and Phase 3. In the
control group, there was a significant difference
between Phase 1 and Phase 2 (F(1,35) = 5.51,
p = .025, partial η2 = .14), and between Phase 1 and
Phase 3 (F(1,35) = 8.09, p = .007, partial η2 = .19), but
no differences were found between Phase 2 and
Phase 3.
Moreover, in the jump group, the changes in
valence were statistically significant between
Phase 1 and Phase 2 (F(1,34) = 29.75, p < .001, partial
η2 = .47), between Phase 2 and Phase 3 (F(1,34) =
9.68, p = .004, partial η2 = .22), and between Phase 1
and Phase 3 (F(1,34) = 8.00, p = .008, partial η2 = .19).
For the control group, no significant differences
were found between phases.
With respect to cognitive performance, Table 2
summarises the mean scores for all the tasks in each
phase. The analysis of variance did not yield any sig-
nificant difference between groups on any
task throughout the study, and there was also no sig-
nificant group x phase interaction. However, to
analyse in detail the trends and significant effects
observed, a simple effects analysis was carried out in
order to compare between phases within each
group. This analysis revealed a trend consisting of an
improvement in the performance of the jump
group between Phase 1 and Phase 2 on most of the
cognitive tasks, which was not observed in the
control group.
The results of the simple effects analysis for each cog-
nitive test performed in the study are described below.
Digit span task
Although the differences between Phase 1 and Phase 2
in the spanmeasure in the jumpgroupdidnot reach sig-
nificance (p = .06), the number of correctly recalled
series showed a statistically significant increase in the
score between Phase 1 and Phase 2 in the jump group
(F(1,39) = 4.86, p = .033, partial η2 = .11). As shown in
Figure 4, the difference between Phase 2 and Phase 3
and between Phase 1 and 3 was not significant in
either group.
Go/No-Go task
No significant differences were observed in accuracy
on the No-Go trials between phases, in either group.
Regarding the RT for the Go trials, in the jump group
the contrast revealed significant differences between
Phases 1 and 2 (Phase 1 > Phase 2; F(1,38) = 5.71,
p = .02, partial η2 = .13), and between Phases 1 and 3
(Phase 1 > Phase 3; F(1,38) = 12.16, p < .001, partial
η2 = .24), but no differences were found between
Phase 2 and 3. In the control group the contrasts
revealed significant differences between Phase 1 and
Phase 2 (F(1,36) = 7.28, p = .011, partial η2 = .17),
between Phase 2 and Phase 3 (F(1,36) = 5.62, p = .02,
Table 1. Mean raw scores (scale 1–9) and standard deviations for arousal and valence and results of the one-way ANOVA including group as a
factor.
Arousal Valence
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Jump group M 4.83 7.58 4.47 7.78 8.80 8.34
SD 1.96 2.11 2.25 1.26 .57 .77
Control group M 3.59 4.08 4.31 6.81 6.86 6.75
SD 1.42 1.94 1.99 1.37 1.33 1.34
ANOVA F 9.94 56.18 .12 10.79 72.95 37.59
Sig .002 .000 .731 .002 .000 .000
η2 .12 .43 .00 .12 .49 .35
Table 2. Mean scores and standard deviations for all the cognitive tasks per group in each phase.
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Controls Jump Group Controls Jump Group Controls Jump Group
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
IOWA Gambling TaskTask −22.97 581.20 −238.19 765.54 106.76 537.44 120.71 865.61 182.43 695.89 243.03 1028.11
Digit Span (Max span) 4.97 .87 4.71 .90 4.92 .97 4.98 .92 4.83 .94 4.88 .76
Digit Span (Correct
series)
4.84 1.50 4.59 1.66 4.81 1.85 5.17 1.66 4.75 1.80 5.03 1.39
Go-No Go (RT) 379.08 44.07 391.12 56.90 367.10 43.01 375.81 48.71 357.60 43.01 374.59 44.59
Go-No Go (Accuracy) .93 .09 .93 .08 .93 .08 .92 .08 .94 .09 .92 .07
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partial η2 = .35), and between Phase 1 and Phase 3 (F
(1,36) = 23.88, p < .001, partial η2 = .40). Figure 5
graphically represents the mean RT on the Go trials
and the significant differences.
Iowa Gambling Task
For the IowaGambling Task, thewithin-subjects analysis
of variance did not reveal statistical differences between
phases in the control group. Conversely, the jumpgroup
significantly improved their net gain immediately after
jumping (Phase 2) compared with Phase 1 (F(1,32) =
4.54, p = .041, partial η2 = .12), which also increased
between Phase 1 and 3 (F(1,32) = 4.49, p = .042, partial
η2 = .12). The mean net gain in each phase in the
control and jump groups is shown in Figure 6.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to assess whether a
significant change in self-reported arousal and
valence levels experienced during a high arousal situ-
ation – a 30 m bungee jumping free fall – affects infor-
mation processing. To this end, we aimed to explore
the impact of arousal and valence levels on cognitive
tasks that assess working memory (reverse digit
span), selective attention (Go/No-Go task), and
decision-making (Iowa Gambling Task). A group of
bungee jumpers was assessed before and at two
times following the jump, and their scores were com-
pared against a control group of participants who did
not jump. The control group was included in order to
discard learning effects as a result of repeating the
same task 3 times within a short period of time. The
results obtained were rather clear-cut: The bungee
jumping activity significantly increased the self-
reported scores on the two emotional components
(arousal and valence) in the jump group compared
with the control group (except for arousal score at
Phase 3, indicating recovery) with the jump group
also showing the highest scores immediately after
jumping, which indicates that the activity was able to
induce acute changes. This, in turn, was accompanied
by an improvement in some of the tasks, which will
be described further. In particular, in the jump group
arousal levels significantly increased in Phase 2, and
returned to baseline at Phase 3, while in the control
group there was a sustained increase. However, given
the very small effect sizes the latter was possibly due
to an artefact or a mild increase in the level of alertness
required to perform the tasks correctly. Valence scores
were significantly higher in the jump group at all
phases and although the levels dropped at Phase 3,
they remained significantly higher than those observed
in Phase 1, indicating an enduring effect on valence.
These high positive valence ratings are worthy of
further discussion, as they appear to be crucial for inter-
preting the present findings.
Figure 4. Mean (and standard error) number of correctly recalled
series. *Difference is significant at p < .05.
Figure 5. Mean RT (and standard error) on Go trials. *Difference is sig-
nificant at p < .05. **Difference is significant at p < .005.
Figure 6. Mean net gain (and standard error) in the Iowa Gambling
Task. *Difference is significant at p < .05.
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Regarding working memory, participants in the
jump group showed an overall improvement in the
total number of correctly recalled series of digits,
which returned to baseline in Phase 3, whilst for the
control group no increases were observed across
the phases. This pattern of findings confirms that the
results found in this task are not attributable to learn-
ing processes. Both groups showed equivalent levels
of performance in Phase 1, indicating that in the
jump group working memory was not impaired prior
to experiencing an arousing activity, contrary to the
findings observed in previous studies (Idzikowski &
Baddeley, 1987; Leach & Griffith, 2008). Although the
testing time points of those studies are not directly
comparable because they differ in the number of
minutes participants were tested before jumping
(30 min in our study, 10 min in Leach and Griffith’s
study and not specified in Idzikowski and Baddeley’s),
the three time points are similar in the sense that none
of the studies tested participants very close to the time
of jump for practical reasons. However, in our study,
there were no differences in subjective arousal
between Phase 1 and Phase 3 in the jump group,
and valence was significantly higher (more positive)
than in the control group at Phase 1. This pattern
can be interpreted as a lack of self-reported anticipat-
ory anxiety (characterised by high arousal and nega-
tive valence), which may explain why we did not
find the impairment observed in the other two
studies. Another striking finding is that performance
actually improved after jumping, which is inconsistent
with the reviewed studies that either found an impair-
ment (Leach & Griffith, 2008; Robinson et al., 2008), or
no change in the functioning of both storage and pro-
cessing components of working memory (Leach &
Ansell, 2008; Leach & Griffith, 2008; Robinson et al.,
2013) immediately after an extreme experience.
Selective attention, however, appeared to be
unaffected by the activity, as both groups performed
identically in all phases in terms of accuracy on the
Go/No-Go task, a score that remained stable
between phases. RT significantly decreased across
phases, but this pattern of results was observed in
both groups (except between Phase 2 and 3 in the
jump group), and it therefore could be argued that
this probably reflects a learning effect due to the
nature of the task, which was relatively short and
unchallenging. In any case, the acute increase in
arousal and valence levels did not seem to have any
impact on selective attention. In this regard, Leach
and Griffith (2008) suggested that time is crucial in
the sense that it can be an extra resource that helps
to overcome cognitive impairments, and in line with
the processing efficiency theory, individuals are able
to perform at similar levels of effectiveness when com-
pensatory resources, such as added time, are devoted
to the task. This assumption implies a slowing down of
the cognitive capacities and information processing, a
trade off that has also been reported by Idzikowski
and Baddeley (1987), who found a decrease in the
speed of letter search but not in accuracy when par-
ticipants were tested under high levels of anxiety.
However, we failed to observe this pattern of perform-
ance in the Go/No-Go task.
Finally, regarding the Iowa Gambling Task, our
results suggest that, on the one hand learning
effects can be ruled out since the net gain in the
control group did not significantly increase across
phases. On the other hand, the jump group obtained
a significantly higher net gain immediately after
jumping, although it could be argued that this
finding is due to the fact that the scores obtained
prior to the jump were so low that these could be
taken to indicate an impairment that was not
present after jumping. However, it should be noted
that the differences between groups were not signifi-
cant in Phase 1. Therefore, although we cannot con-
clude whether performance was actually improved
by the activity or else impaired before the jump, the
fact that the scores observed in the jump group at
Phase 1 were considerably more negative prompts
the suggestion that the participants most likely per-
formed poorly, leading to more negative gains,
which was resolved after the jump when values
were almost identical to those of the control group.
It is plausible to think that working memory capacity
is taken up with thoughts related to the forthcoming
activity at Phase 1, and, as suggested by Hinson,
Jameson, and Whitney (2002), higher working
memory loads during execution of the Iowa Gambling
Task interfere with the development of somatic
markers to a higher extent, thus impairing decision-
making.
Taken together, our results suggest that the
bungee jumping activity – although proven to be
capable of inducing acute changes in emotional
responses – does not impair cognitive performance
(at least in the tasks employed here), and can even
lead to improvements. A free fall from a 30 m high
bridge is a situation that can be perceived as poten-
tially life-threatening and one that significantly
increases arousal levels, as the organism interprets
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the situation as a state of emergency. The main differ-
ence between our study and previous studies con-
ducted on emergency and stressful conditions relies
on valence. As expected, due to the recreational
nature of the activity, in all phases valence scores in
the jump group were significantly higher than those
in the control group, reaching a peak value immedi-
ately after the jump (almost at ceiling). This is in line
with the rise in β-endorphins and enhanced euphoria
ratings following a bungee jump, reported by Hennig
et al. (1994). Therefore, valence could be the key
factor, since previous studies in the literature have
not evaluated this component, which means we
cannot rule out the possibility that in these studies
the participants experienced the stressors used as
negative. The decline in cognitive abilities found in
previous studies has traditionally been explained by
the processing efficiency theory, which is based pri-
marily on anxiety. Anxiety and arousal are two terms
that are conceptually distinguishable and should not
be used interchangeably, particularly since anxiety
implies a negative valence and low dominance
whilst an increase in arousal can be linked to both
positive and negative valence. In the present study,
the SAM questionnaire responses indicate that whilst
self-reported arousal was very high, valence was very
positive, and so anxiety, or arousal alone, cannot be
put forward to explain the pattern of results obtained
here. Conversely, positive valence combined with high
arousal could be responsible for the improvement, or
the lack of impairment, observed in these tasks.
Although we expected some degree of moderation,
that is, an attenuation of the negative impact of
high arousal reported in the literature, we did not
predict an actual improvement or a total lack of
impairment.
In this regard, Fredrickson (2001) suggested the
Broaden-and-Build theory, which emphasises the differ-
ential role of positive emotions. This theory states that
positive emotions are capable of broadening thought-
action repertoires and building personal resources
(physical, intellectual, and psychosocial) that are
necessary to cope with a given situation. These
resources are supposed to be acquired under con-
ditions in which a positive emotional state is experi-
enced but also have the property of being durable.
As predicted by the processing efficiency theory, a
state of high arousal combined with a negative
valence (anxiety) recruits resources, narrows attention,
and impairs the central executive component of
working memory, thus compromising performance.
The way to overcome this cognitive load is to mobilise
auxiliary or compensatory resources and it is here
where positive emotions might play a role. In this
regard, it has been suggested that positive affect
broadens the scope of cognition and action, making
cognitive organisation more flexible, an effect that
could be attributed to an increase in dopamine levels
(Ashby, Isen, & Turken, 1999). Fredrickson (2001) also
states that positive emotions could mitigate the detri-
mental effects of negative emotions, speeding recovery
from psychophysiological reactivity and helping the
body return to baseline levels of arousal. The fact that
in our study arousal levels returned to baseline at
Phase 3 (which took place only 8 min after the jump)
appears to provide support for this assumption. Taken
together, the acute increase in valence found could
have been strong enough to overcome the negative
outcomes attributable to high arousal. Because
arousal was accompanied by positive – and not nega-
tive – valence, we can say with confidence that
anxiety was not present, and thus the expected impair-
ments due to anxiety were not found. Conversely, a lack
of impairment and even an improvement could be
observed in the jump group. Future research should
aim at directly comparing valence (positive vs. nega-
tive) with similar levels of arousal within a single
study. Another future line of enquiry could include bio-
logical arousal markers such as cardiovascular reactivity
or cortisol levels.
The results of the present study might be con-
sidered to have applied relevance in areas such as
the emergency services (e.g. fire-fighters, ambulance
drivers, civil protection personnel), in which pro-
fessionals must behave and make rapid decisions
under arousing conditions to ensure the survival of
both themselves and others. Training these pro-
fessionals to cope with emergency situations by enhan-
cing and focusing on the positive emotions derived
from their actions could improve – or at least not
impair – their cognitive performance when facing
threats.
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